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This paper shows the value of school autonomy for educational performance. To fully capture 
the informational advantage of local actors, we define school autonomy as the operational 
empowerment  of  the  principals  and  teachers.  The  Flemish  secondary  school  system  in 
Belgium  is  analyzed  as  it  is  has  a  long  history  of  educational  school  autonomy,  but 
considerable  variation  between  schools  in  school  staff  empowerment.  Combining  detailed 
school level and pupil level data from the PISA 2006 study with a semiparametric hierarchical 
model, we find strong indications that operational school autonomy is associated with high 
educational  performance  if  appropriate  accountability  systems  are  active.  Sensitivity  tests 
show that both low and high-performers benefit from this kind of school autonomy. 
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A remarkable stylized fact of educational economics is that higher school resources do not
necessarily yield higher pupil performance. Evidence for an overall large eect of school
resource policies on pupil performance is largely missing (Hanushek, 2003; W omann, 2003).
It cannot be excluded however that the eect of input-based policies on pupil performance is
moderated by the incentive structure of school actors (Hanushek, 2003). Since the incentive
structure of school actors is embedded in school institutions, insight in the latter may be
crucial to understand the relation between school resources and pupil performance.
There is accumulating cross-country evidence that getting incentives right by a combination
of monitoring and autonomy is benecial for educational eciency (W omann, 2008). Since
these studies compare institutions across countries the results may be biased because of an
obvious omitted variable problem. Any other source of cross-country variation, like legal or
cultural dierences, may indeed bias the results. A simple identication strategy to circumvent
the omitted variable bias problem and test the robustness of cross-country evidence would
be to focus on the within-country variation in monitoring and autonomy, since cultural, legal
and other country level variables can no longer bias the estimations. The problem however
with this identication strategy is that the within-country variation is in most countries too
small for insightful inference. In W omann (2010), one of the few papers that employ this
strategy, regional variation across the 16 German states is used as microcosmos to show
the robustness of the cross-country evidence. The limited number of observations in this
study (only 16 regions) limits considerably the statistical power of the conducted tests. The
rst contribution of this paper is that we employ the strategy of within-country variation of
institutions on a dataset of pupil level performance1, which gives us the degrees of freedom
needed for statistical inference. We study pupil level performance in Flanders, where we
consider Flanders as a `natural experiment' with large within-region variation in school level
institutional settings.2 The second contribution of the paper is that we restrict ourselves to
a narrow denition of autonomy. We only look into the eects of autonomy of principals and
teachers, the local agents that, through their local informational advantage, are supposed to
boost educational outcomes. This identication strategy brings our work closer to a clean test
of the supposed eects of autonomy in a principal-agent framework, where the government is
the principal and the local school actors (principal and teachers) are the agents.
1A pupil level study was not possible in W omann (2010) due to condentiality requirements
2With school level institutional settings we capture the school-specic level of among others choice, account-
ability, autonomy, teacher quality, selectivity, etc. This is thus dierent from the system-level institutional
settings.
2Since 1989 Belgian education is administered by the country's three communities, the Flem-
ish Community, the French-speaking Community and the German-speaking Community. We
focus on the Flemish Community (hence Flanders) because it is characterized by the needed
within-country variation in school institutions and is considered to have the most eective
accountability system (Hirtt, 2007). In Flanders, secondary education starts at age 12 and
ends at age 18. Freedom of education and free parental school choice are enshrined in Bel-
gium's Constitution of 1831.3 The government subsidizes schools if they meet the minimal
requirements. The main requirement is to set out a curriculum that is in line with the nal
and developmental objectives set by the government. In other words, the central government
sets `end goals'4 and leaves it to the underlying levels how to attain these `end goals'. This
considerable level of local autonomy in the organization of education has however not yielded
a diverse educational landscape. About 75 percent of pupils are in Catholic schools, nearly
25 percent in publicly organized schools and only a very small proportion of pupils are in
non-Catholic non-public schools. Considerable school policy autonomy was entrusted with
non-prot school groups (`de inrichtende macht') that can group several schools of the same
type within the same city or region. The studies of Eurydice (2007, 2008), an EU-nanced
network that provides information on and analysis of European education systems and poli-
cies, provide insight in the structure of school autonomy in Flanders in an internationally
comparable way. Neither schools, nor intermediate government institutions have the auton-
omy to set the salaries of teaching or non-teaching sta. Schools have no autonomy in setting
the end goals, though full autonomy in the curricular content of optional subjects. Schools
also have full autonomy over teaching methods, textbook choice, grouping of pupils, pupil
assessment and the decision whether a pupil should resit a year or not. Little to nothing
is known in the Eurydice data however on the school level variation in the empowerment
of school sta. In this paper we will exploit the considerable variation - both in Catholic
and public schools - in the ability of the school's direction and teachers to set crucial school
policies, as a strategy to identify the eect of school actor incentives on the relation between
school resources and output.
Theoretical background The impact of school autonomy is linked to several strands of
the literature. The decentralization of education may boost eciency and productivity by
eliminating unnecessary bureaucratic burdens (see Niskanen (1971) and Niskanen (1991), for
seminal work on budget maximizing bureaucrats). School autonomy may help schools to over-
3This guarantees that every natural or legal entity has the right to establish and organize schools au-
tonomously and that a parent can inscribe his/her child in the school he/she wants (if place is available).
(Moller et al., 2007)
4In the Flemish Community, these are `eindtermen'
3come bureaucratic rigidity and in this way impact student performance positively (Bottani
and Favre, 2001; Chubb and Moe, 1990). Entrusting the provision of education to local agents
may also lead to more ecient provision because local agents will be closer and more respon-
sive to student needs and preferences since students can `vote with their feet' by changing
school or even community. Tiebout (1956) shows that decentralized public good provision
may, under certain conditions, yield the ecient provision of public goods like education.
Hoxby (1999) conrms this Tiebout hypothesis for local school productivity under much less
restrictive conditions. This suggests that the combination of decentralization and free school
choice may indeed provide greater opportunities for local citizens and students to monitor
and discipline the local agents that are responsible for educational policy, thereby creating
greater eciency and productivity. If the decentralization of education is accompanied by
public information on school performance, it may also be conducive to yardstick competition
(see Shleifer (1985), and Besley and Case (1995)) among schools, in this way encouraging the
adoption of more eective teaching methods and more ecient operational procedures. Card
et al. (2010) for example recently nd signicant eects of enhanced competition on the test
score gains of students in Canada in all studied school systems. They however also point at
a possible negative eect of this yardstick competition. It cannot be excluded that \in more
competitive markets teachers and principals spend more time and eort preparing for stan-
dardized tests, and less on other aspects of learning. If \test skills" have limited intellectual
value, the eort devoted to competing over test outcomes is socially wasteful, and the higher
test score gains observed in more competitive markets may be counter-productive" (Card et al.
(2010), p. 29-30). In weak institutional environments, decentralization may have some addi-
tional negative implications, like increased levels of uncoordinated rent-seeking and corruption
as government structures become more complex and devoluted (Fan et al., 2009), increased
coordination costs and slower institutional reform. The most important negative consequence
of increased autonomy may lie in a potential principle-agent problem (see W omann et al.
(2007)). The government (principal) tries to improve cognitive skill creation by delegating
responsibilities to schools (agents) that are assumed to have a local information advantage
over the principal. A principal-agent problem appears when the interests of the government
and the school diverge and information is asymmetric. Interests typically diverge for decisions
that inuence the nancial position of the school or the workload for school actors. Budget
formulation and curriculum content are therefore policy areas with a high probability of di-
vergence between the interests of the government and the school. In process and personnel
decisions on the other hand, little divergence of interest is expected. This principal-agent
problem can be solved by ensuring that the government has enough information on the eort
of schools to improve cognitive skills of the pupils. If information is suciently symmetric,
4autonomy is therefore expected to enhance educational eciency. Central examinations are a
widely used mechanism to keep the information asymmetries between government and schools
in check (W omann et al., 2007), but other mechanisms can be used to attain this goal. In
Flanders, as in the rest of Belgium, there are no central examinations, but inspection teams
investigate on a regular basis whether the curriculum and teaching process are aimed at reach-
ing the centrally imposed `end goals' and whether budget formulation is in accordance with
the posed requirements. Benchmarking by parents is possible as the inspection reports are
publicly available. In addition, freedom in budget formulation is limited to additional fund-
ing, above the centrally imposed funding system. Consequently, information asymmetries are
limited in decision areas with a high probability of divergent interests, like budget formu-
lation and curriculum development. We therefore expect that the principal-agent problem
will be limited in Flanders and that the institution of school autonomy, through improved
incentives for schools and teachers, will aect resource-allocation decisions and ultimately the
educational performance of students positively.
How to measure school autonomy? School autonomy is a rather vague concept. PISA
(2006) shows that increased autonomy does not necessarily go hand in hand with more re-
sponsibilities for the principal or the teachers, because the responsibilities may be delegated
to the school governing board instead. In the principle-agent framework, school autonomy
is mainly expected to yield higher eciency because the local actors (the principal and the
teachers) have important informational advantages. If responsibilities are delegated to the
school governing body however, it is less clear why we should expect a positive eect on e-
ciency. Studies that fail to appreciate these dierent types of autonomy may underestimate
the benecial impact of school autonomy. Hallinger et al. (1996) were the rst to measure
principals' activities in key dimensions of a school's instructional program and to relate these
to student outcomes such as reading achievement. W omann (2003) is one of the rst to look
into the eect of individual teacher inuence over teaching on student performance. In our
study we will explicitly focus on autonomy of principals and teachers, using the data made
available by PISA (2006). The PISA dataset among other things looks specically into the
roles that principals and teachers might play in educational decision-making and contains
measures of centralization and decentralization for these dierent functions.
52 Data
2.1 PISA 2006
We use the PISA 2006 dataset. Since 1989, Belgian education is organized by the Flemish
community, the French-speaking community and the German-speaking community. We fo-
cus on the Flemish community because it is characterized by the needed large variation in
principal and teacher autonomy, while this is much less the case in the other Belgian com-
munities. The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an internationally
standardized assessment of pupils of 15-year old in the subjects of reading, math and science.
The assessment in all subjects covers the acquisition of essential knowledge and competencies.
(see OECD (2006))
There are 3 cycles: PISA 2000, PISA 2003 and PISA 2006. In 2006, the survey was im-
plemented in 57 countries. The PISA dataset is rich in variables related to educational
achievement, family background and school level institutional settings. The main focus of
PISA 2006 is on science, however all pupils are also requested to complete a standardized
test on math, science and reading and ll out a survey with questions related to their family
background, views on issues related to science, the environment, careers, learning time and
teaching and learning approaches of science. Every principal in participating schools is asked
to complete a survey with questions over the characteristics of the school.
Tests are typically constructed to assess between 4500 and 10000 students of age 15 in each
country. To sample the target population of 15-year old pupils that are at least in grade 7,
PISA 2006 has implemented a two-stage stratied sample design. In stage 1, for each strata5,
schools are sampled proportionally to size from a list of schools in the region (PPS sampling).
The target was 150 schools in each region. In stage 2, 35 pupils are randomly drawn from a
list of 15-year old pupils in the school.6 Final student weights are constructed to correct for
varying selection probabilities of the students.7 In PISA 2006 the plausible value approach
is used to estimate the pupil performance in respectively mathematics, science and reading
literacy. These plausible values are random values from the posterior distribution and cannot
be aggregated at pupil level (OECD, 2005). Therefore, in what follows, we use the rst
plausible value component to estimate educational outcomes in math, science and reading at
pupil level. A Balanced Repeated Replication (BRR) procedure with 80 replication estimates
5A group of schools, formed to improve the precision of sample based estimates.
6If the school has less than 35 pupils, all pupils are included in the sample.
7This occurs because certain subgroups that are over- or under-sampled, the information of school size at
the time is not completely correct, school non-response, student non-response and the inclusion of trimming
weights to ensure stable estimates.(OECD, 2009)
6- described in OECD (2005)- is used to construct standard errors and to account for sampling
variation (OECD, 2009).
Pupils in special education or part-time education are dropped from the sample. Pupils in
private-funded schools or with missing values for some variables are also dropped from the
sample. By this, the sample is reduced to 3430 observations. Sub-schools are dened to
control for ability tracking in general, technical-arts and vocational education. A sub-school
is dened as a unit that provides either general, technical-arts, or vocational education. When
a school provides both general and technical or arts education (there are only a few), then
the school is treated as two separate (sub-)schools. The sample consists of 238 sub-schools.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the educational achievement of pupils in Flanders.
Standardized test scores for math, science and reading are high in Flanders (PISA average is
500). But the high standard deviation of educational outcomes indicates that the inequality
in individual test scores is also high in Flanders. The performance of non-native pupils is in
Flanders lower than the performance of native pupils.
Table 1: Pupil performance
Variablea Mean s.e.
PISA 2006 Performance in math, ltered sample (FS) 561 (3.4)
PISA 2006 Performance in reading, FS 543 (3.2)
PISA 2006 Performance in science, FS 546 (2.9)
PISA 2006 Standard deviation of performance in math, FS 87.0 (1.7)
PISA 2006 Standard deviation of performance in reading, FS 89.3 (2.0)
PISA 2006 Standard deviation of performance in science, FS 81.8 (1.4)
Performance of native pupils in science, FS 550 (3.0)
Performance of rst-generation immigrants in science, FS 458 (14.4)
Performance of second-generation immigrants in science, FS 491 (12.3)
Perf. of non-natives that speak other language at home in science, FS 453 (9.0)
Dierence PISA 2006 and PISA 2000 on readingb -10 (7.7)
Dierence PISA 2006 and PISA 2003 on math -10 (4.5)
aA SAS procedure for a Balanced Repeated Replication procedure with 80 replication estimates and 5
plausible values for each subject, described in OECD (2005), is used to construct the mean and standard error.
bSource: OECD (2006)
72.2 School sta empowerment
In line with Eurydice, the PISA 2006 data, summarized in Table 2, show that Flanders is
characterized by considerable autonomy in stang, budget issues, assessment and discipline
of pupils and that most of this autonomy is entrusted with the principal and the teachers. To
obtain insight in the overall school sta empowerment, we create the composite index \school
sta empowerment" as the proportion of the following issues where the principal or teachers
have signicant responsibility on: (1) hiring teachers, (2) ring teachers, (3) course content,
(4) courses oered, (5) student assessment, (6) student discipline, (7) budget formation, (8)
budget allocation. Figure 1 shows that both public and privately-operating schools have large
operational autonomy. Therefore, we have no reasons to expect per se that privately-operating
schools will be more ecient than public schools. This is in line with Cherchye et al. (2010).
Cherchye et al. (2010) nd no evidence that privately-operating schools are more ecient than
public schools in primary education in Flanders if the results are controlled for environmental
dierences (among others socio-economic background). Figure 1 not only indicates that the
school sta is on average strongly empowered, but also suggests there is considerable variation
across schools in the level of school sta empowerment.
School autonomy is only expected to benet educational eciency if the information advan-
tage of the school sta is employed and if information asymmetries are limited. The high
level of local sta empowerment found in this section indicates that the school autonomy in
Flanders will indeed employ the information advantage of local sta. As regards the informa-
tion asymmetries, we already discussed above why several accountability systems ensure that
information asymmetries are rather limited in Flanders. In short, Flanders is characterized
by a combination of school sta empowerment and accountability. We hypothesize that this
combination of school sta empowerment and accountability will, after controlling for socio-
economic and school-level institutional variation, aect educational performance of students
positively.
8Table 2: The Responsibility structure
Variablea Mean s.e.
Responsibilities school board
hiring teachers 1.00 (0.00)
ring teachers 1.00 (0.00)
course content 0.73 (0.04)
courses oered 0.87 (0.03)
student assessment 0.98 (0.01)
student discipline 0.99 (0.01)
budget formation 0.98 (0.01)
budget allocation 0.97 (0.02)
Responsibilities principal or teachers
hiring teachers 0.96 (0.02)
ring teachers 0.83 (0.03)
course content 0.72 (0.04)
courses oered 0.83 (0.04)
student assessment 0.97 (0.02)
student discipline 0.98 (0.01)
budget formation 0.85 (0.03)
budget allocation 0.85 (0.03)
aA SAS procedure for a Balanced Repeated Replication procedure with 80 replication estimates, described
in OECD (2005), is used to construct the mean and standard error.
9(a) Public education (b) Privately-operating education
Figure 1: Histogram school sta empowerment (sub-school level)
2.3 Control variables
Inputs To relate variation in outcomes to family background, we consider 2 socio-economic
variables: socio-economic status and migration status. First, family socio-economic status
is estimated by PISA 2006 as a composite index of the Economic and Socio-Cultural Status
(ESCS) of a pupil, derived from (1) the highest occupational status of each student's parents,
(2) their highest educational level, and (3) a summary measure of household possessions.
Second, for migration status, three proxies are used. First-generation immigrants and second-
generation immigrants are respectively dened as pupils that are not born in Belgium and
pupils that are born in Belgium, but are children of immigrants. Pupils that are rst- or
second-generation immigrant and do not speak an ocial Belgian language at home are
grouped in a third variable of immigrants that do not speak an ocial Belgian language
at home. The socio-economic and cultural status (ESCS) shows substantial variation across
pupils. The proportion of non-native pupils is around 5 percent. 2 percent of the pupils in the
sample do not speak an ocial Belgian language at home. In addition, there is signicant lin-
guistic fractionalization in schools. In ordinary secondary education in 2006, public spending
per pupil was 7208 euros in Flanders (Eurybase, 2008). Schools receive funding and `teaching
hours' according to the number of pupils. Schools with more disadvantaged pupils receive
additional resources ('GOK beleid'). On average, schools have a modest lack of educational
resources (e.g. instructional material, labs) (the average is above the PISA 2006 average of
0). There are on average 9 pupils per teacher.
10Institutional settings In Flanders, pupils in ordinary education are tracked in the rst
year of secondary education in general education, technical education, arts education and
vocational education based on prior achievements. In our ltered sample, 51 percent of pupils
are in general education (high track), 32 percent are in technical-arts education (middle track)
and 18 percent in vocational education (low track).8
If a pupil has not reached the basic skills, determined by the `end goals' in a school year,
grade repetition and re-orientation to lower tracks are used. In our ltered sample, 79 percent
of pupils are `on time' in Flanders.
Private-granted schools are only a negligible proportion of the school population. There are
mainly public schools (under control of community, provinces, cities or municipalities) and
private operating, public-granted schools (e.g. Catholic schools, non-confessional schools).
In our ltered sample, 74 percent of pupils are in privately-operating schools. Selection by
schools is ocially not allowed within a track. However, Table 3 indicates that selection
on academic record or recommendation is frequently used. In Hanushek and Luque (2003),
a signicant positive eect is found of competition of private schools. In Hoxby (2000),
evidence is found that Tiebout choice leads to better school performance in the US.9 However,
Rothstein (2006) notes that the positive eect of competition depends on the way parents
choose schools. If parents choose schools on characteristics not related to school productivity,
the positive impact of competition on the incentive structures in schools disappears. In sum,
if the parents choose schools on productivity, competition is expected to be benecial for
educational eciency. Table 3 shows that there is considerable competition between schools
in Flanders. 81 percent of the pupils are in schools where the principal declares that 2
or more schools compete for the same pupils. In addition, there is a competition eect of
the existence of both public-operating and private-operating schools. Other accountability
systems than the formal inspection exist. A signicant proportion of the schools are faced
with parental pressure on academic standards. Tracking achievement over time and comparing
pupil achievements within the same school also occur frequently. The true eect of school size
in a cross-section study at pupil level is dicult to disentangle from the eect that parents
choose schools with high education quality, with as consequence higher school size for better
schools. Therefore, we do not analyze the eect of school size in this cross-sectional analysis.
In line with Rivkin et al. (2005) and Kane et al. (2006), we expect that the relation between
formal teacher quality and true teacher quality is weak. Therefore, no positive eect is
8We merge the technical and arts tracks together because the two tracks do not dominate each other in
curriculum diculty and test scores and because there is only a small proportion of pupils that are in the arts
track.
9In Hoxby (2003), an overview of the economics of school choice can be found.
11expected of formal teacher quality.
Shortage in educational personnel can have negative eects on the teacher quality and teaching
process in a school. Therefore, a negative sign is expected. Because we are interested in the
general perception of shortages in adequate teaching personnel, we focus on the more general
proxy: shortage of adequate teaching sta in areas other than math, science and reading.
Shortages of teachers in a specic area are too specic and for math and science, there is
a well known systematic shortage in teachers. Student-teacher ratio, homework and lessons
outside school are insightful at system-level, but are dropped from the pupil level analysis
because of problems of reversed causality.
12Table 3: Summary statistics
Variablea Mean s.e. Expected
Inputs
School educational resources (index) 0.11 (0.08) +
Quantity of lessons math, reading and science (FPC index) -0.17 (0.04) +
Student-teacher ratio 9.09 (0.05) Dropped
Economic and Socio-Cultural Status (ESCS) 0.20 (0.02) +
Proportion of rst-generation immigrants 0.032 (0.01)  
Proportion of second-generation immigrants 0.025 (0.01)  
Immigrants that speak non-o. Belgian language at home 0.02 (0.00)  
Linguistic fractionalization 0.09 (0.01)  
School institutional settings
Choice
School choice (2 or more schools that compete for same pupils) 0.81 (0.04) +
Accountability
Student comparison to other pupils in the same school 0.56 (0.05) Dropped
Student comparison to benchmark 0.00 (0.00) Dropped
Achievement data used to evaluate teachers 0.15 (0.04) Dropped
Achievement data used to make resource allocation decisions 0.04 (0.02) Dropped
Achievement data tracked over time 0.74 (0.04) Dropped
Parental pressure on academic standards 0.49 (0.05) +
Autonomy
School responsibilities 0.94 (0.01) Dropped
School sta empowerment 0.87 (0.01) +
Formal teacher quality and teacher shortage
Proportion of teachers with 5A diploma 0.40 (0.01) CV
Shortage of teachers in math, reading or science (FPC index) -0.54 (0.12) Dropped
Shortage of teachers in other disciplines 0.21 (0.04)  
School type
School type (Public=1) 0.26 (0.02) CV
Control variables
Selection by schools on academic record or recommendation 0.70 (0.05) CV
Ability grouping within school 0.55 (0.05) Dropped
Lessons outside school (index) -0.16 (0.02) Dropped
Homework (index) -0.02 (0.03) Dropped
Small community (village or small town) 0.32 (0.04) CV
School size 6.90 (0.24) Dropped
Gender (female=1) 0.48 (0.02) CV
General education 0.51 (0.02) CV
Technical-arts education 0.33 0.02 CV
Vocational education 0.18 0.02 CV
Grade 10 0.79 (0.01) CV
Number of observations in ltered sample 3430
aA SAS procedure for a Balanced Repeated Replication procedure with 80 replication estimates, described
in OECD (2005), is used to construct the mean and standard error of the mean. The school educational
resources index summarizes the inverse of the principals' responses to seven questions on the adequacy or
shortage of educational resources. Linguistic fractionalization is created as in Alesina et al. (2003) with as
groups: Dutch, French, German, Arab, East European language, other West European language, Turkish,
English, other
133 Methodology
Educational settings are complex and heterogeneous. First, the largest part of the empiri-
cal data have a multilevel structure (pupils are nested within classes, classes within schools,
schools within regions and school types, etc.). It is necessary to include this highly multi-
level data structure into the empirical analysis to obtain unbiased estimates (Raudenbush
and Bryk, 2002). This can be done by the use of so called `hierarchical' or `mixed' model.
This implies that the intercept - and in some models also the slopes - is allowed to randomly
vary between groups. To estimate the eects of school-level institutional factors and family
background on student achievement, a multilevel regression analysis is carried out where co-
variates are distributed at two levels: the students and sub-schools. In an educational setting,
unobserved school eects are expected from school-level disparities in e.g. the unobserved aca-
demic culture of school sta. As students are clustered in dierent schools, the assumption
of independent noise is violated. It is thus necessary to include random school eects into the
empirical analysis to obtain unbiased estimates.
Second, as result of the complex, heterogeneous nature of the data structure, imposing para-
metric assumptions on the relationship between educational inputs and output can lead to
biased estimates if there is misspecication. As it is unclear how school sta empowerment
aects the educational performance, it is advisable to use a more exible approach. Non-
linearities and interactions can be addressed in dierent ways. First, polynomial expansions
and parametric interactions can be considered. This would be easy to implement, but the
risk of introducing multicollinearity is very high. Second, nonparametric approaches can be
considered. Fully non-parametric approaches do not impose parametric assumptions on the
functional form, but imply the so called `curse of dimensionality' - that is that including a
large amount of regressors dramatically slows down convergence speed - and involves prac-
tical diculties to include random eects. To avoid the `curse of dimensionality', we use a
semiparametric additive mixed model approach.
We dene pupil test scores Y as a function of socio-economic, institutional predictors X, and
unobserved determinants such as innate ability and random noise at the pupil level . To
allow for hierarchically clustered noise, we dene  as the random eect of school. We dene
a semiparametric varying-intercept model as:
14Y = 0 + 1x1 + 2x2 + ::: + pxp
+ s1(xp+1) + s2(xp+2) + ::: + sq(xp+q)
+ tp1(xp+q+1;xp+q+2) + ::: + tpr(xp+q+r;xp+q+r+1)
+  +  (1)
where f, with f = 1;:::;p are the xed parameters of the p categorical variables, sk, with
k = 1;:::;q are the smooth functions for the q additive continuous variables and tpl, with
l = 1:::;r the smooths for the bivariate terms of r + 1 continuous variables.10
Semiparametric regressions can be estimated by the use of kernel weights or by using piece-
wise polynomial functions - splines. Each approach has its own merits and drawbacks in a
particular setting. We opt for a spline based approach as it is less cumbersome to use with
large datasets.
A large methodological literature has focused on the issue how to represent smooth func-
tions and to choose the smoothness of these functions (Wood, 2006). The popular backtting
approach of Hastie and Tibshirani (1990) has as advantage that multiple smooth terms can
be included. The largest disadvantage is that the model selection (= selection of number of
smooths) can be quite cumbersome (Wood and Augustin, 2002). The alternative approach
of Gu and Wahba (1991) has solved the model selection problem. However, the high com-
putational cost of the Gu and Wahba (1991) approach is an important practical barrier. A
regression spline approach as proposed in Eilers and Marx (1996), Marx and Eilers (1998),
Wahba (1980) and Wahba (1990) is a computationally ecient approach to estimate a semi-
parametric additive model with integrated model selection. We use this regression spline
approach as implemented in the mgcv package in R as described in Wood (2006) with auto-
matic and integrated smoothing parameter selection. As for now, the spline approaches are
not suited to include categorical variables, we include the categorical variables parametrically.
We thus have a semiparametric partially linear mixed model.
In specic, we opt for the penalized splines (P-splines) approach of Eilers and Marx (1996)
to smooth the continuous variables, as this is robust for dierent scales of the covariates in a
bivariate smooth.
The smooth function of a spline approach is a weighted sum of a basis of r overlapping splines.
10Multivariate smooths can also be introduced, but are not used in this analysis as we use a tensor product
of B-splines as discussed later. Multivariate tensor products of B-splines imply a dramatic loss of degrees of
freedom.
15Figure 2(a) illustrates a cubic spline with local support (B-spline)11. By altering the weight
of the splines by weight parameter j, with j = 1;:::;r on usually evenly spaced knots in
function of minimization of the squared error, we obtain a exible nonparametric smooth -
as shown in Figure 2(b). Formally, the smooth function ^ s(x)()i can be represented as the





jBj(x), such that 8x;
r X
j=1
Bj(x) = 1: (2)
To estimate a regression via P-splines,  is estimated by minimizing the squared error (known
as the L2 norm) with inclusion of a penalty on wiggliness for each smooth function to avoid
oversmoothing. Usually, the second order dierences are penalized (d=2), however other









with 4dj being the dth order dierences, that is 4dj = 41(4d 1j) with 41j = j j 1
and with  a non-negative smoothness parameter.
(a) Univariate cubic B-spline basis (b) Smooth via B-splines
Figure 2: B-splines, source: Bollaerts (2009)
To allow for interaction between variables, bivariate smooths are needed. A popular approach
is the use of a tensor product. A bivariate spline of degree q can be dened as
Bjk(x1;x2;q) = B
(1)
j (x1;q)  B
(2)
k (x2;q) (4)
11A univariate B-spline of degree q smoothly joins q+1 polynomial pieces of degree q at q interior knots in
the local support. The local support implies that outside the boundaries, the value is zero.
16with x1, x2 the regressors, B(1) and B(2) the two univariate B-splines. The estimated bivariate

























r the partial dth order dierences of x1 and 4d
c the partial dth order dierences of x2.
It is trivial that the L2 can be extended to include simultaneously a parametric part, random
eects, univariate smooths and bivariate smooths in an additive approach.
3.1 Empirical model
To investigate whether educational performance of pupils is associated with the empowerment
of school sta, we use the dened semiparametric partially linear additive mixed model. It is
possible that the eect of school sta responsibility is dependent on the school composition
and on the school type. Therefore, we allow interactions between school type, school sta
empowerment and school ESCS. As output variable we consider the rst principal compo-
nent of pupil test scores on math, science and reading (with mean 20 and standard deviation
1.5). To control for the institutional and socio-economic variation in the educational setting
in Flanders, we include control variables for (1) the pupil socio-economic status : migration
status and pupil ESCS, (2) gender, (3) ability tracking, (4) grade repetition, (5) community
eects, (6) linguistic fractionalization, (7) the quantity of lessons math, science and reading,
(8) school-level educational inputs: the formal quality of the teaching sta, shortage of ade-
quate teachers and school educational resources (9) school-level institutional settings: school
choice, parental pressure and selectivity of the schools. We do not present results that control
for the rather vague accountability measures and for within-school ability tracking. However,
results including these variables are equivalent to the presented results and are available on
request.
17Pupil performance = 0 + 1Gender + 2First generation immigrant + 3Second generation imm.
+ 4Language at home + 5Not lagging behind
+ 6General education + 7Technical-arts education + 8Public school
+ 9School choice + 10Parental pressure + 11Selectivity of school
+ 12Teacher shortage + 13Small community
+ s1(Lessons math, science and reading)
+ s2(Formal quality teachers)
+ s3(School educational resources)
+ s4(Linguistic fractionalization) + s5(Pupil ESCS)
+ tp1(School sta empowerment,School ESCS)Public education
+ tp2(School sta empowerment,School ESCS)Private education
+  +  (7)
4 Results
The estimated semiparametric partially linear model explains 60 percent of the variation in
educational performance between pupils. A large part of this explanatory power nds its
origin in socio-economic control variables.
The parametric part of our semiparametric model as described in Table 4 shows signicant
eects of migration status. We nd an eect of migration status over and above the eect
of the socio-economic status of pupils. This eect is further amplied if the non-native
pupil does not speak a Belgian language at home. We also nd a signicant eect of school
type. However, due to strong self-selection of pupils into school types, based on unobserved
variables, a value-added approach is needed to obtain more reliable evidence on this matter.
As expected, the control variables for ability tracking, grade repetition and teacher shortage
are signicant. No evidence is found that the variation in educational performance in Flanders
can be explained by variation in parental pressure, variation in school choice (competition),
variation in selectivity of schools and variation in community size. However, this does not
mean that these variables cannot have an eect at system-level.
The smoothed variables, as shown in Table 5, Figure 3 and Figure 4, show in addition that
pupil ESCS matters for educational outcomes. Within a school, there is still an eect of
ESCS. Linguistic fractionalization in the school is found to be detrimental for educational
18achievement. This can be the result of a 'getto-school' eect or the eect of an environment
where pupils have linguistic barriers to learn and cooperate with each other. In line with
existing evidence, no eect is found for the formal quality of teachers. True teacher quality
is distinct from formal quality. The control variables for the amount of lessons math, science
and reading is also signicant.
Last but certainly not least, we nd that school sta empowerment matters. Figure 3 shows
clearly that there is a positive eect of school sta empowerment on educational outcomes. In
addition, we nd that this eect is stronger in schools with more disadvantaged pupils, that
may need a more tailored approach. By separating the smooth by school type, we show that
this positive eect of school sta empowerment can be found in both privately-operating and
public schools. Table 5 shows the signicance of the bivariate smooth of school ESCS and
school sta empowerment. Results available on request show the signicance of both terms
separately if school ESCS and school sta empowerment are modeled as univariate smooths.
Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 18.45 0.11 173.81 0.00
Gender -0.15 0.04 -4.38 0.00
First-generation imm. -0.24 0.12 -2.03 0.04
Second-generation imm. -0.19 0.12 -1.56 0.12
Language at home -0.61 0.15 -4.22 0.00
Not lagging behind 0.80 0.04 18.23 0.00
General education 1.94 0.10 19.13 0.00
Technical-arts education 1.14 0.08 15.01 0.00
Public school -0.24 0.06 -3.79 0.00
School choice -0.06 0.07 -0.87 0.38
Parental pressure 0.04 0.05 0.72 0.47
Selectivity of school 0.09 0.06 1.55 0.12
Teacher shortage -0.17 0.06 -2.64 0.01
Small community 0.08 0.06 1.32 0.19
Signicance levels :  : 10% :  : 5%  : 1%
Table 4: Parametric coecients
19F-value p-value
tp(School sta empowerment, School ESCS)Private education 2.75 0.02
tp(School sta empowerment, School ESCS)Public education 4.36 0.00
s(Lessons math, science and reading) 41.17 0.00
s(Formal quality teachers) 1.40 0.24
s(School educational resources) 3.15 0.04
s(Linguistic fractionalization) 15.63 0.00




Signicance levels :  : 10% :  : 5%  : 1%
Table 5: Approximate signicance of smooth terms
(a) Interaction school ESCS and school sta em-
powerment in private schools - perspective plot
(b) Interaction school ESCS and school sta em-
powerment in public schools - perspective plot
Figure 3: The eect of school ESCS and school sta empowerment
20(a) Number of lessons math, science
and reading (index)
(b) Proportion of teachers with 5A
diploma
(c) School material for education (d) Linguistic fractionalization
(e) Pupil ESCS
Figure 4: The eect of univariate smooth terms
5 Eects at the Top and Bottom
We tested the robustness of the ndings by altering the econometric and economic model
specication. We regressed a fully parametric model with random school eects, inclusion
21of variation in probability weights and clustering within strata. In addition, we tested the
eect on the results of including the `dropped' variables. The ndings are robust for all the
discussed specications. Results available on request
More importantly, we also checked wether we obtained dissimilar eects at the bottom and the
top of the ability distribution (as measured by test scores). In particular, we tested whether
the uncovered association between school sta empowerment and average pupil performance
can also be found for top and low performing pupils. For this, we estimate a quantile regression
as initiated in the seminal work of Koenker and Bassett (1978). This approach allows a more
complete picture of the conditional distribution of pupil performance. In this approach the
conditional th quantile ( 2 (0;1)) is dened as the test threshold such that  percent of
the pupils of the reference group perform worse. For example, in the socio-economic status x,
25 % of the pupils performs worse than the score threshold q0:25(x). It is common practice to
use a so called `check function approach' to estimate a quantile regression via minimization




(yi   xi^ ) (8)




 if   0 (resp.   0)
(   1) otherwise
with  being dened as yi xi^ . Weight factor  indicates how positive and negative values of
 are weighted. If  = 0:5, positive and negative values are equally weighted and the median
is estimated. If  = 0:75, positive values of  receive a weight that is three times higher than
the weight of negative values; the third quartile is estimated.
However, a drawback of a quantile regression approach is the lack of a consensus on how
to include random school eects in the model. As such, the advantage of a more complete
picture of the conditional distribution of pupil performance comes at the cost that we cannot
control for random school eects.
We opt for the parametric quantile regression approach, as implemented in the package
`quantreg' in R. We estimate 50 quantile regressions with  between 0.025 and 0.975. To
allow for interaction and quadratic eects, found in the discussed semiparametric model, we
include quadratic terms for the quantity of lessons, pupil ESCS and school educational re-
sources and allow for interaction between school sta empowerment, school type and school
ESCS.
The results in Figure 5 and 6 show the relation between the conditional quantile (x-axis) and
22the estimated coecient (y-axis). The shaded area denotes the 90% condence interval and
the dashed horizontal line the conditional mean estimates (with no random school eects).
The results show robustness of our ndings. School sta empowerment has a signicant
positive eect on pupil performance. This eect is higher for pupils in schools with low
average ESCS and is not signicantly dierent between school types. The negative interaction
between school ESCS and school sta empowerment is higher in public schools. In addition,
no indications are found for dierent coecients between lower and upper quantiles; both the
low and top performers benet from higher school sta empowerment.
23Figure 5: Quantile regression results - part I
24Figure 6: Quantile regression results - part II
256 Conclusion
In this paper we have tested whether a combination of accountability and autonomy in educa-
tion provision is benecial for educational eciency. There is ample cross-country evidence for
this conjecture, but these studies are invariably faced with an omitted variable bias. We test
this conjecture on the PISA-dataset for Flanders, where we consider Flanders as a `natural
experiment' with large within-region variation in school level institutional settings. Flanders
presents a very useful natural experiment for several reasons. Increased delegation of respon-
sibilities is expected to yield increased educational eciency only if the central government
(principal) delegates responsibilities to schools (agents) that have a local information advan-
tage over the principal and if the interests of the government and the school do not diverge or
information on school performance is symmetric. In Flanders, the government delegates a lot
of responsibilities to school principals and teachers. This high level of local sta empowerment
should lead to better use of local information and hence higher eciency, if the central gov-
ernment can avoid a principal-agent problem by monitoring school performance. In Flanders,
there are no central examinations, but inspection teams investigate on a regular basis whether
the curriculum and teaching process are aimed at reaching the centrally imposed 'end goals'
and whether budget formulation is in accordance with the posed requirements. In addition,
freedom in budget formulation is limited to additional funding, above the centrally imposed
funding system. This ensures that information asymmetries are limited in decision areas
with a high probability of divergent interests, like budget formulation and curriculum devel-
opment and therefore limits the scope for principal-agent problems in Flanders. Therefore
Flanders is a very good testing ground for the theory that the institution of school autonomy,
through improved incentives for schools and teachers, will aect resource-allocation decisions
and ultimately the educational performance of students positively.
Our ndings support this hypothesis. Controlling for a large battery of controls (migration
status, pupil ESCS, gender, ability tracking, grade repetition, community eects, linguistic
fractionalization, the quantity of lessons math, science and reading, the formal quality of
the teaching sta, the shortage of adequate teachers and school educational resources, school
choice, parental pressure and selectivity of the schools) we nd indeed that local sta em-
powerment clearly boosts educational outcomes. This positive eect of increased autonomy
is stronger in schools with more disadvantaged pupils, and is present in both public and
privately-operating schools. This is clear evidence of the theory that increased school auton-
omy, if appropriately implemented, has the potential to yield better educational outcomes.
Does the combination of accountability and autonomy boost educational eciency? Yes.
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